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1. - Introduction 
The starting point of fiscal federalism - or the economic analysis of de-
centralized public governance - is that there are some economic functions 
that a central government should not be concerned with. Granted this, the 
substantive issue is organizational: to precisely define which functions should 
be centralized and which should be left to local jurisdictions (e.g., should 
health care and education be centralized or local?). Since the definition of 
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the local versus central function most often also coincides with the public fi-
nancing question - e.g., if local government is responsible for garbage col-
lection, then should it also extract the garbage collection tax?: - the public 
organizational issue has become the staple of the public economist rather 
than of the organizational economist. 
Apparently, in fact, the research of the public economist and the organi-
zational economist is unrelated. Though both make use of the tools and prin-
ciples of economics, public economists specialize in understanding the the-
ory and practice of government intervention in terms of spending and tax-
ation, and organizational economists in understanding industry structure and 
policy as well as the firm. 
Recently, boundaries have been crossed. Fiscal federalism is now begin-
ning to be analyzed through the lens of contemporary industrial and eco-
nomic organization theory2. 
The organizational approach that is emerging in local public finance has been 
called by Qian - Weingast [1997] Second Generation Theory of fiscal federal-
ism (SGT). The present paper is concerned with the emerging SGT It shows 
that the organizational approach of the SGT is in fact not so novel and tries to 
argue for a more balanced approach. The sections that follow 
• establish context by quickly introducing the two classic motivations in sup-
port of federalism; 
• suggest that other theories of public economics already implied an orga-
nizational approach; 
• show that another, though complementary, organizational design view of 
public sector decentralization is implicit in Tiebout [1956]; 
• and, overall, argue that the positive heuristic of the SGT should also in-
clude the organizational approach implicit in Tiebout. 
1 Frey [2001] subtly shifts the foundation of this taxation question from the hierarchy of govern-
ments to the spatial scope of governments. He suggests that the first best solution to this problem 
is «functional, overlapping, and competing jurisdictions», namely, competing governments with-
out territorial monopoly. A proposal that, parenthetically, can seemingly be traced back as far as 
Montesquieu [1748/1989]; compare also Ostrom [1971/1987, pp. 129-130] and Boschken [1982] 
on the Federalist [1787-1788/2001]. Frey is optimistic about his proposal if it is constitutionally es-
tablished, although he obviously recognizes the nonnegligible difficulties of achieving it. Volckart 
[2002] shows the existence of such governance structure in European history, but is more skepti-
cal than Frey about the possibility of achieving it today. 
2 See, inter alia, Weingast [1995], Cremeref al. [1996], Seabright [1996], Garzarelli - Limam [2003], 
Tommasi - Weinschelbaum [2003], Garzarelli [2004], Josselin - Marciano [2004], and Oates 
[2004]. 
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2. - The two classic motivations in favor of federalism 
It is possible to identify two classic motivations, which are actually the two 
faces of the same coin, favoring federalism. 
The first motivation is incentive-based. It asserts that decentralized pub-
lic governance is able to limit better than its centralized alternative the con-
centration of power in the hands of the few or the one. The rationale is sim-
ple: federalism aids the separation of powers by dividing a state into small-
er, federated states. Differently put, federalism is seen as enhancing ac-
countability in public governance, thus limiting inefficient behavior of var-
ious sorts. This motivation for decentralization is found especially in such 
classics as Montesquieu [1748/1989], Blackstone [1765/1960], Hamilton -
Jay - Madison [1787-1788/2001], de Tocqueville [1835/1990, Ch. 8, p. 
160], and Acton [1907/1967, p. 98]. (We may in many ways consider this mo-
tivation as the economic equivalent of the familiar political checks and bal-
ances one.) 
The second motivation is knowledge-based. It asserts that, contrary to its 
centralized alternative, decentralized public governance performs a benefi-
cial cognitive function because, thanks to local jurisdictions, it is possible for 
citizens to more easily communicate their needs to government . This oth-
er classic motivation is found in Hamilton -Jay - Madison [1787-1788/2001, 
e.g., Papers Nos. 30-36, pp. 145-79; see especially p. 172] and in de Toc-
queville 's Democracy in America. For example: in «great centralized nations 
the legislator is obliged to give a character of uniformity to the laws, which 
does not always suit the diversity of customs and of districts; as he takes no 
cognizance of special cases, he can only proceed upon general principles; and 
the population are obliged to conform to the requirements of the laws, since 
legislation cannot adapt itself to the exigencies and the customs of the pop-
ulation, which is a great cause of trouble and misery. This disadvantage does 
3 In the same spirit, decentralization moreover generates new knowledge, especially about policy 
options, because it enables federated states to perform various sorts of social experiments au-
tonomously. Such experiments lead to diffused benefits within the federation as a whole because 
the various states, including the central one, can learn from the failures and successes of others. 
This related knowledge motivation for decentralization finds perhaps its clearest statement in Bryce 
[1888/2004, p. 257] and, later, United States jurisprudence: New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 US 
282, 1932 (Justice Louis D. Brandeis, dissenting). See also the opinions of Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 1919 and Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 
1921 who, dissenting, defended the experimental nature of the First and the Fourteenth US Con-
stitutional Amendments respectively. Justice Brandeis agreed with Justice Holmes in these cases. 
Though the laboratory role of federalism is related to the knowledge approach discussed here, a 
detailed discussion of it lies outside the scope of the present paper; but for an attempt to discuss 
the laboratory role in terms of the SGT, see Garzarelli [2004]. 
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not exist in confederations; Congress regulates the principal measures of the 
national government, and all the details of the administration are reserved 
to the provincial legislatures» [DE TOCQUEVTLLE, 1835/1990, Ch. 8, p. 163, 
emphasis added]. 
As the next section shall elaborate, the more familiar theory of fiscal fed-
eralism - henceforth referred to as First Generation Theory or FGT -
though primarily taking its basic inspiration from both de Tocqueville and 
the Federalist [e.g., OATES, 1972, 1999], has primarily picked up the thread 
of the knowledge motivation. While the SGT has so far only focused on the 
incentive one. But, contrary to the FGT, the SGT is, as mentioned, a still-
emerging research program. As such, its boundaries are not yet fully defined. 
It can therefore still easily accommodate the knowledge motivation for de-
centralization. Indeed, I will later suggest that Tiebout's work can be re-
garded not only as one of the seminal works of the FGT, but also, if indi-
rectly, as a contribution containing the basics of a knowledge-based organi-
zational approach that could complement the SGT. 
3. - First Generation, Second Generation, and other theories of fiscal federalism 
The FGT, as just noted, favors federalism on knowledge grounds. By 
bringing the consumer-voter closer to the state, it suggests that decentral-
ization helps to solve the value problem of the public sphere, that is, the 
problem of how to husband utility of a nonexcludable and nonrival good at 
efficient cost. The quintessence of such belief is arguably Oates's Decen-
tralization Theorem, which proposes that «in the absence of cost-savings 
from the centralized provision of» a local public «good and of interjurisdic-
tional externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typ-
ically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided in each 
jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained 
across all jurisdictions» [OATES, 1972, p. 54, original emphasis]. 
The justification of such normative proposition - by Oates's [1999, pp. 
1122-1124] own admission - is disarmingly simple. As de Tocqueville and 
Hamilton, Jay, and Madison implied, there's a higher probability of match-
ing local public good demand if public good supply is not centralized, i.e., 
uniform across jurisdictions. When the Theorem doesn't hold, the central 
government will internalize (through grants-in-aid) interjurisdictional ex-
ternalities until the federation's marginal social benefits equal marginal cost. 
Such FGT conception is a legacy of the Samuelson [1954, 1955], Mus-
grave [1959] and Arrow [e.g., 1969/1977] public finance tradition. Since this 
tradition determines the internal functioning of state organization residual-
ly, it favors a familiar market failure argument the presumption of which is 
Old and New Theories of Fiscal Federalism, Organizational Design Problems, and Tiebout 95 
that both central and local governments act in the public interest. The main 
stimulus for the birth of the SGT is such anonymous conception of the state 
innate in the FGT. Much like the theory of the firm before Coase [1937] that 
sees organization as mere production function, the SGT does not consider 
the state as an organization. Simply put, it does not envision the state as a 
structure with problems of, for example, low-powered incentives and op-
portunistic behavior. 
Be that as it may, the concrete matter of contempt raised by the SGT 
is that an anonymous conception of the state blocks off several avenues of 
theoretical investigation that could offer valuable information about the 
different public accountability effects of alternative public governance 
structures. Or, seen from a different perspective, the SGT contends that 
an organizational approach to local public finance can cast a brighter light 
on the incentive-aligning effects of decentralization. The SGT hence pro-
poses to study such familiar issues as the possible transaction-cost mini-
mizing role of the state, the proper assignment of decision rights among 
levels of government, and the alignment of incentives in the vertical 
structure of the public sector through the lens of contemporary organi-
zation theory. Let us briefly consider three SGT contributions from the 
New Institutional (or transaction cost) economics, incomplete contract 
and principal-agent perspectives to render this point a little more con-
crete4. 
Weingast's [1995, p. 1] SGT contribution is motivated by the follow-
ing «fundamental political dilemma»: a «government strong enough to 
protect property rights and enforce contracts is also strong enough to con-
fiscate the wealth of its citizens». The weak accountability constraints em-
bodied in many public governance structures make politicians suffer from 
commitment myopia. One public governance structure that seems to 
work at different times and places - i.e., that allows for limited political 
intervention through economic checks and balances - is, suggests Wein-
gast, federalism. Weingast accordingly calls his suggested SGT approach 
to decentralized public organization market-preserving federalism. The 
upshot of market-preserving federalism is that competing jurisdictions 
create incentives for credible commitments and lower transaction costs. 
Seabright [1996] uses the 'incomplete contract' (or 'new property right') 
approach to analyze fiscal federalism [see also CREMER etal. 1996]. The typ-
ical setting of the incomplete contract framework is, of course, the firm; in-
deed, the party who manages to minimize rent-seeking costs is usually the 
owner of the firm. But since incomplete contracts include political man-
4 See Oates [2004] for a more extensive and detailed review of the relevant literature. 
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dates, constitutions and treaties, another setting could be public governance 
structures. It is thus suggested that a central government can maximize col-
lective welfare through the possession of the residual rights for policy 
alignment among local governments - that is, for the offsetting of exter-
nalities among federated states. But the central government need not always 
act in the best interest of citizens; whereas decentralization, it is pointed out, 
can increase political accountability. In light of this trade-off, Seabright's 
model suggests that political accountability can be an organizational moti-
vation for decentralization in spite of lack of difference of taste among lo-
cal jurisdictions. 
Tommasi - Weinschelbaum [2003] use one of the models proposed by the 
so-called common agency theory to explore the decentralization versus cen-
tralization decision. Like in the incomplete contract SGT approach, they 
suggest that interjurisdictional preference heterogeneity is not a sufficient 
condition to justify fiscal federalism: incentives also matter. They point out 
that a federally organized state may be a more efficient governance structure 
than a centralized one also - if not above all - for citizens (principals) to con-
trol politicians (agents)5. 
Before proceeding to Tiebout I would like to succincdy make reference to 
two other approaches present in the literature that share similar concerns. These 
approaches are the Public Choice (PC) and the derived Political Economics. 
The general organizational emphasis on incentives borrowed from or-
ganization theory that is now explicitly advocated in the subdiscipline of 
fiscal federalism does not imply that the overarching public economics lit-
erature has entirely neglected the organizational dimension of the public 
sector. PC has in fact made organization writ large a substantial part of 
its research program. Indeed, already in one of his earliest contributions 
Buchanan was unambiguous about the organizational nature of the state: 
the state is one instance of division of labor that emerges in order to pur-
sue some ends through collective action, i.e., it is nothing more than the 
summation of individual wills the public cost curve of which (abstractly) 
remains an average and not a marginal one [BUCHANAN, 1949, p. 498]. 
For our purposes, the more specific issue to underscore is that in PC fed-
eralism basically enters the picture as a way to limit the grip of the fisc6. De-
5 Take note that the definition of who is the principal and who the agent in organizational mod-
els of fiscal federalism is a relative one; some studies view the central government as the principal. 
Josselin -Marciano [2004] offer a historical analysis of competition over principalship by using US 
Constitutional history as a case study, showing that such competition can cause conflicts among 
states and also vary principalship through time. 
6 Auster - Silver 11979] uses some industrial organization theory in what is an essentially PC frame-
work to analyze the functions (or the output) of the state (but still considers state organization as a 
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centralized public finance defines the proper scope and objective of govern-
ment by allowing for competition among various levels of government. It cre-
ates incentives by injecting some market characteristics into the public, es-
pecially political, sphere. The incentive function of federalism is double: to 
limit die discretion of central state action and to limit the extraction of con-
sumer-voters' surplus by local jurisdictions7. In sum, PC is principally con-
cerned with avoiding a Leviathan state, and sees decentralization as one way 
to achieve this. 
Persson - Tabellini [1996] focus on incentive issues among countries or 
regions that have decided to partake in macroeconomic risk. They point 
out that, under asymmetric information, the sharing of risk leads to the 
familiar moral hazard problem: when the principal (e.g., the EU central 
government) is the one offering the insurance protection, there is a high 
probability that the agents (EU member states) will work below their po-
tential (e.g., will not fully absorb local macroeconomic shocks). The ques-
tion that emerges is then of organizational design: which incentive struc-
ture best balances out the risk-sharing-moral hazard trade-off? Drawing 
on the incomplete contract, principal agent, and voting literatures in their 
Political Economics approach Persson and Tabellini conclude that, in cer-
tain cases, it is possible that a federal fiscal constitution allowing for cen-
tralized insurance protection can curb the distortions generated by moral 
hazard. 
4. - Tiebout: A rereading 
The previous section points out that, contrary to the FGT, the SGT and 
other germane economic theories not only put forth an organizational ar-
gument for decentralization, but that such argument primarily hinges on 
production function). For the distilled essence of the differences between the traditional public fi-
nance and Public Choice approaches see Buchanan - Musgrave [1999], wherein pages 155-202 are 
also dedicated to federalism. The work of Vincent Ostrom [e.g., 1971 /1987 and OSTR( )M et al. 1961 ] 
is in some ways forerunning as well. 
7 The theme is also present in the subsequent New Institutional (or transaction cost) economics 
literature [e.g., N O R T H , 1981; WEINGAST, 1995] that, as we saw, the SGT more explicitly views as 
central to its ken. In fact, at least prima facie, the only dividing line on the matter between the New 
Institutional Economics and P C would seem be the origin of the state. Through conjectural his-
tory, PC sees a contractual origin of the state [BRF.NNAN - BUCHANAN, 1985]; the New Institu-
tional Economics conversely leaves matters open. North writes: whether «the state originated as 
a predatory group attacking and exploiting a peasant village - a predatory origin of the state - or 
developed out of the communal needs for organization of the peasant village - a contract origin of 
the state - cannot be resolved» [ N O R T H , 1981, p. 64]. 
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an incentive-based motivation. This section rereads Tiebout's seminal 
contribution. It attempts to show that, similarly to the FGT, Tiebout of-
fers a knowledge-based motivation for decentralization. But, unlike the 
FGT, such motivation is adduced by Tiebout on organizational grounds8. 
Tiebout's «A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures» is a critique of the 
Samuelson public finance argument9. In the Samuelson argument, public 
good allocation is often not 'optimal'. Unlike a market setting where con-
sumers and producers reveal their preferences for private goods through 
supply and demand interaction, there is no market-type solution to de-
termine the level of expenditure of public goods. The typical outcome in 
a public setting is in fact free-riding. The nonexcludability and nonrival-
ry properties of a public good assure that the public good is consumed ir-
respective of complete preference revelation. A constituent 'consumer-
voter' tends to minimize preference revelation, a magnitude directly re-
lated to personal tax burden, for he understands that he will still enjoy the 
public good thanks to the taxes paid by others. This 'market failure' calls, 
in the Samuelson argument, for state intervention along Pigouvian lines. 
But two major questions arise. First, how can the state 'force' the full 
disclosure of consumer-voter preferences? Second, assuming full disclo-
sure, can these preferences be satisfied like in a private goods market? An-
swering these questions is equivalent, according to Tiebout, to finding the 
'optimal' solution to the problem of taxation. And the answer to these 
questions, Tiebout further observes, rests on devising «social institutions» 
[TlKBOUT, 1956, p. 418] that lead to market-like organization in the pub-
lic sector, viz., in organizing the public sector so that it allows consumer 
sovereignty in the form of spatial mobility among competing jurisdictions 
according to public good preference. 
Tiebout hence presents a model of local government expenditure that 
tries to determine the optimal level of public goods through a mechanism 
of preference revelation of the consumer-voter. He criticizes the Samuel-
son assumption that expenditures for public goods are handled at the cen-
tral government level by arguing that several government services are pro-
vided at the local level too. Accordingly, he presents a spatial mobility 
model wherein the consumer-voter selects his preferred supply of public 
good by selecting among competing local jurisdictions: the consumer-vot-
er discretionally moves to that community that most satisfies his set of 
K Seabright [1996, p. 63, note 3] agrees: «Tiebout's model is best seen as a pioneering contribu-
tion to the theory of mechanism design, rather than saying anything about the decentralization of 
power in governments 
'' And thus also of the subsequent Musgrave and Arrow one. 
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preferences. T h e Tiebout model is in this manner able to represent the 
preferences of the population more adequately than national level mod-
els; and at the same time yield a solution for the level of expenditures for 
local public goods. Thus , it was later said that in the Tiebout model peo-
ple vote with their feet. 
As Tiebout himself often underscores in his article, he is presenting a 
model with extreme assumptions. But what he was after in his purely the-
oretical piece, we hinted, is actually an organizational design problem. To 
Tiebout the at tempt to approximate a market of the public sector, as it 
were, is in fact nothing more than a heuristic expedient devised to illus-
trate an organizational design issue or, if you prefer, a knowledge prob-
lem10. It is an informational or public-good externality that impedes the 
optimal amount of public good provision. In different terms, the reason 
for the lack of equivalence between the sum of the marginal rates of sub-
stitution and marginal cost a la Samuelson may be organizational. 
Th i s is particularly clear if one thinks that the optimal amount of pub-
lic good provision is a relative or comparative matter: it varies with juris-
diction, notwithstanding mobility. As Oates recently observes in reference 
to the Tiebout model, 
«the gains from decentralization, although typically enhanced by [...] mobility, 
are by no means wholly dependent on them. [...] In fact, if there were absolutely 
nothing mobile - households, factors, or whatever - there would still exist, in gen-
eral, gains from decentralization. The point here is simply that even in the absence of mo-
bility, the efficient level of output of a 'local' public good, as determined by the Samuelson 
condition that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution equals marginal cost, will typ-
ically vary from one jurisdiction to another. To take one example, the efficient level of 
air quality in Los Angeles is surely much different from that in, say, Chicago* 
[OATES, 1999, p. 1124, my emphasis]. 
This point is important, for it shifts the focus of attention from market fail-
ure considerations to comparative institutional analysis. This opens the door 
to the consideration of different institutional or organizational arrangements 
for the internalization not only of physical and spatial externalities, such as 
nuisance and pollution, but also of those concerning production and ex-
10 Fischel [2001, pp. 35 ff.] reports a personal anecdote. He learned from a conversation with Mus-
grave in 1994 that Tiebout had been a graduate student in Musgrave's class on public finance at 
Michigan. And that in such class Tiebout had the original idea about his now well-known model. 
But Tiebout, continued Musgrave, had brought up the idea in a jokingly manner - to not be tak-
en too seriously. So, Tiebout's sense of humor - reported by many to be wonderful - is the pri-
mary culprit behind a contribution that Tiebout himself thought should not be taken too literal-
ly, but as an instance of provocation. 
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change, or, in a word, organization. Relatedly, the emphasis on such other ex-
ternalities does not a priori rule out that some organizational arrangements 
emerge not only to obviate detrimental but also to generate beneficial exter-
nalities of the same (and other) type11. As Tiebout [1956, p. 423] puts it, poli-
cies «that promote residential mobility and increase the knowledge of the 
consumer-voter will improve the allocation of government expenditures in the 
same sense that mobility among jobs and knowledge relevant to the location 
of industry and labor improve the allocation of private resources». 
This other reading of Tiebout hints to a knowledge motivation for feder-
alism from die organizational viewpoint. Indeed, although Tiebout arguably 
leaves matters open as concerns possible advantages of local government in 
internalizing public-goods or information type externalities [CREMER et al., 
1996, pp. 41-43], die role played by taxes in his model is nonetheless a knowl-
edge one: taxes perform a communication function for local public goods sim-
ilar to that of the price system for private goods. And it is the induced com-
petition among alternative organizational forms that transmits such knowl-
edge; that reduces the uncertainty tied to marginal public good pricing. 
Tiebout can, therefore, be interpreted as implicitly endorsing an avant la 
lettre comparative institutional analysis of two alternative governance struc-
tures of the public sector on knowledge grounds. The implied alternative re-
al-world structures for preference revelation that are compared are the vot-
ing mechanism and local public finance. And the balance, as known, tips in 
favor of local public finance. But the spirit of comparative institutional 
analysis is in Tiebout as well. «A general reduction of costs along with a re-
duction in one or more of the services provided cannot be justified on eco-
nomic grounds unless the social welfare function is known. For example, 
those who argue for a metropolitan police force cannot prove their case on 
purely economic grounds. [...] If one of the communities were to receive less 
police protection after integration than it received before, integration could 
be objected to as a violation of consumer's choice» [TIEBOUT, 1956, p. 423], 
In the Tiebout model the parties involved in the bargaining or commu-
nication process are the consumer-voters and die state qua organization. And 
it is the state that by means of this process should respond effectively to the 
needs of the consumer-voter [TIEBOUT, 1956, p. 417]. In the «Tiebout mod-
el», specifies for example Oates, «local jurisdictions use benefit taxes that ef-
fectively communicate to households the cost of consuming different levels of 
" Compare, for instance, Coase [1960], Demsetz [1969], Dahlman [1979], Cremer et al. [1996], 
and Langlois - Foss [1999]. This point also emerged earlier in the specific context of the organi-
zation of local governments in Ostrom's work on water supply, see for instance his later work with 
Tiebout and Warren, which also offers a summary of such point: Ostrom et al. [1961, pp. 838ff.]. 
Developing this connection in detail here would lead us too far astray. 
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local public goods; this results in an efficient pattern of consumption of these 
goods. But this is true not only for households. If local governments provide 
local inputs that increase the productivity of capital employed in their juris-
dictions, then they should levy benefit taxes on capital in order to provide 
the set of signals needed for the efficient deployment of capital across locali-
ties [...]» [OATES, 1999, p. 1125, emphasis added]. 
Or, to put it all in different words, when preference heterogeneity is high, 
it makes economic sense, for the provision of public goods, to reduce the 'cog-
nitive distance' between the consumer-voter and the polity. The minimiza-
tion of cognitive distance between the consumer-voter and the polity through 
fiscal decentralization is the 'program' one wishes to solve when searching the 
solution space of the vertical organization of the public sector. Because it in-
volves specific knowledge, the solution to this program is necessarily an or-
ganizational one: creating local jurisdictions for consumer-voter mobility. 
Let me take care at this point not to be misunderstood. I am not main-
taining that the Tiebout model is a break from 'conventional' theory. That 
is, there is no doubt that the implicit benchmark against which the rhetoric 
of the Tiebout model rests is that of perfect competition theory - a theory 
devoid of any institutional or organizational substance12. If we nevertheless 
separate the rhetorical chaff from the substantive wheat we perceive a view-
point that suggests that comparative organizational or institutional consid-
erations are of the essence for questions concerning the vertical structure of 
the public sector.13 In brief, the Tiebout model embeds - if obliquely - an 
organizational view of public sector decentralization that emphasizes the 
knowledge motivation that the SGT has yet to consider. 
5. - Conclusion 
This explorative work tries to contribute to the interpretation of the Sec-
ond Generation Theory of fiscal federalism. It begins by introducing the two 
classic motivations in favor of federalism, namely, incentive-alignment and 
knowledge. Then, it discusses the organizational approach that the SGT and 
other public economics literatures offer, and finds that they mostly focus on 
12 On which see, for example, Vihanto [1992]. 
15 In fact, what more precisely Tiebout intentionally leaves out from his local public finance contribu-
tion is the political facet of the supply side. He is most explicit about this in his later contribution on 
the matter: this «paper is concerned witii fiscal federalism - fiscal decentralization - purely from the 
point of view of economic efficiency. Alternatively stated, the problem is defined such tfiat - as nearly 
as possible - political federalism is neutral» [TIEBOUT, 1961, p. 79]. This indirecdy reinforces my view 
that Tiebout adduces a knowledge motivation for federalism. Compare on this point Fischel [2001]. 
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the incentive, rather than knowledge, motivation for decentralization. Fi-
nally, it points out that the Tiebout model already embeds an organization-
al approach tJhat rests on a knowledge motivation, allowing us to discuss some 
knowledge functions of fiscal federalism from an organizational viewpoint. 
Though this paper ultimately proposes that a SGT should include both 
the incentive and knowledge motivations for fiscal decentralization, it has not 
provided a polished theory of such proposition. Rather, it presented a sort 
of intellectual progress report. In order to provide a theory of such propo-
sition, future studies should: (1) include a detailed discussion of knowledge-
based approaches to economic organization with which the SGT may ally 
itself with; and (2) attempt to develop an organizational model of fiscal fed-
eralism based on the knowledge motivation. 
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